Information on the conflict in Mali - January 2013

In the face of the worrisome advance of the allied forces, hostilities began on January 9, 2013, in a display of the Islamists’ exorbitant ambition of bringing all of Mali under their yoke. Their Plan A involved celebrating Milad (the anniversary of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), on January 24 this year) in the capital city of Bamako. Plan B was to capture Mopti International Airport in Sévaré (70 km from Konna).

And indeed, during the week of January 8, 2013, the jihadist movements that control Northern Mali – AQMI (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), MUJAO (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa), Ansar Dine (led by a Malian Tuareg) and Boko Haram – launched a new offensive in a move toward the center of the country. In a coordinated attack, they occupied the city of Konna, a strategic position along the front line between the North and the South of the country. Konna is 70 km from Sévaré, where the Malian army is concentrated, along with its equipment, munitions and provisions.

On January 14, while clashes with the Malian army – backed by French air support – were under way around Konna, jihadists occupied the city of Diabaly in Western Mali, near the border with Mauritania.

As a reminder, in a military offensive begun in March 2012, these jihadist organizations had managed to take control of a sizable portion of the Malian territory, including major cities the likes of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. They imposed sharia, forcing women to wear headscarves and prohibiting smoking, soccer and dancing. Other examples of sharia law imposed on the local populations included the stoning of unmarried couples, the legalization of rape done by kidnapping girls for forced marriages, and cutting off the hands and feet of alleged thieves. These groups also have historic ties to drug trafficking and the abduction of Malians and foreign nationals, like activists showing solidarity with the Sahrawi people, and Algerian diplomats. They rearmed themselves heavily after the fall of Gaddafi in Libya, which dispersed heavy weaponry throughout the region.

A faction within the Malian army used President Amadou Touré’s weakness and complicity as an excuse to overthrow him in a coup d’état on March 22, 2012. After that, the situation became even more complicated. Mali has experienced a weakening of its political institutions and of attempts by transition governments that have been unable to handle the situation. A new national unity government was established on December 15, 2012, with the mandate of liberating the North of the country and organizing elections, while ensuring the population’s access to basic social services.

Throughout this period, the Malian government, with the support of a large segment of civil society, asked for international support in resolving the situation. ECOWAS (Economic Community Of West African States) and the African Union have pressed for inter-Malian talks, demanding a National Committee for dialogue between Bamako and the armed, non-terrorist groups, as well as the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), which the Islamists had thrown out of Northern Mali. The President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré – designated by ECOWAS to act as mediator – met with Ansar Dine, the MNLA, and the Malian government. A solemn declaration was presented in early December, and a calendar of consultations and peace talks was in the works.

At the time, a political solution was considered preferable to a dispatch of troops – tentatively scheduled for September 2013 – but more recent events have driven ECOWAS to announce an immediate dispatch. At present, 3,500 soldiers from six countries are expected to be deployed, some of which are already on the ground.
The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2085 on December 20, 2012, based on a draft presented by France, which authorized the deployment of an African-led force to Mali, to allow the country to re-establish its territorial integrity, by reconquering the North, which has fallen into the hands of drug terrorists and which is prey to fundamentalists. This African-led International Support Mission (AFISMA) should, in theory, lend its assistance to the Malian forces, helping to restore security in the Malian State over an initial period of one year.

Following the jihadists’ offensive in Konna, France launched a military intervention, at the request of the Malian government. Officially, the operations began on January 11, with the bombing of MUJAO’s military and administrative camps in Gao and airstrikes on military targets in other cities, such as gas and arms supply posts. After these strikes, the jihadists dispersed and were no longer able to impose sharia in cities like Gao and Timbuktu, where the population began to feel freer and came back to life, with uncovered women, and youths smoking in public. But the jihadists are still in Diabaly, which they entered dressed as civilians, scattered among the population.

The MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) began its military offensive by demanding independence for Northern Mali. It coordinated this offensive with the jihadist organizations and was later pushed aside by its former allies. Now, it is presenting itself in support of France’s actions on the ground. It is asking to conclude negotiations with the Malian government, on the subject of its demand for self-determination, before the Malian army enters the North.

Malian society supports France’s intervention, which it sees as the only possibility for preventing the jihadists from advancing on Bamako and the imposition of sharia across the country. Malians insist on maintaining one nation, that is secular and indivisible. The recent tensions raised around the Family Code and the pressure exerted by a number of Islamist groups against women’s rights should not be forgotten in this saga. In France, as well, Malian movements and associations support the French intervention, viewing it as a necessary evil.  At the same time, it is important to pay attention to France’s geo-strategic interests in the region, as well as the interests of transnationals in the unexploited gas, gold and oil deposits found in Mali’s desert.

The consequences of the conflict have been harsh. On Tuesday, January 15, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 150,000 people had taken refuge in neighboring countries, and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates the number of displaced persons in the country at close to 230,000.

The women of Mali hope that the foreign intervention will be clearly-targeted and short-lived and that, within three months, the cities will be freed from sharia and from the jihadists’ commands and brutality. But they understand that the next steps will involve challenges, like the reconstruction of democratic institutions, the avoidance of inter-ethnic tensions and the resumption of conflict resolution talks.

Given the potential for jihadist infiltration of the capital city and other parts of the country, the Malian authorities have declared a state of emergency, a security measure designed to prevent any further tragedy.